Introduction
Marriage is often described as a lifelong commitment, built on love, trust, companionship and a shared willingness to build a life together. However, where a statutory marriage has broken down irretrievably, the Matrimonial Causes Act[i](the Act) provides a route to dissolution[ii] of the marriage. The Act identifies eight facts on which a court may find that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
This article examines the legal framework for dissolving statutory marriages in Nigeria, with particular attention to domestic violence and behaviour that makes it unreasonable to expect a husband or wife to continue living with the other. A petitioner or cross petitioner relying on section 15(2)(c) does not have to complete the one-, two- or three-year separation periods associated with sections 15(2)(d)-(f). Please note that this is distinct from the section 30 requirement for obtaining court’s leave before dissolution proceedings may be instituted where the marriage is less than two years. This article addresses marriages governed by the Act, not marriages contracted under religious or customary law.[iii]
The Legal Framework for the Dissolution of Statutory Marriages in Nigeria
Under section 15(1) of the Act, the husband or wife may petition for dissolution on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. A mere assertion that the marriage has broken down irretrievably is not enough. The petitioner or cross petitioner must satisfy the court of at least one of the facts set out in section 15(2), that is:
- the respondent has wilfully and persistently refused to consummate the marriage;
- since the marriage, the respondent has committed adultery, and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;
- since the marriage, the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;
- the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least one year immediately before the petition;
- the parties have lived apart for at least two years immediately before the petition and the respondent does not object to a decree;
- the parties have lived apart for at least three years immediately before the petition;
- the other party has failed for at least one year to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights; or
- the other party has been absent for such a time and in such circumstances as to provide reasonable grounds for presuming that he or she is dead.
This article focuses on paragraph (c): the behaviour fact. It recognises that a spouse may seek dissolution where the other spouse has behaved in a way that makes it unreasonable to expect the petitioner/cross petitioner to continue living with them. Domestic violence may amount to such behaviour, subject to adequate proof of same.
What Conduct May Satisfy Section 15(2)(c)?
Section 16(1) gives examples of circumstances in which the court may find that the petitioner has established the fact in section 15(2)(c). They include sexual offences such as rape, sodomy and bestiality; habitual intoxication through alcohol or drugs; repeated criminal convictions; prolonged imprisonment for specified offences; certain offences involving violence against the petitioner; habitual and wilful failure to provide maintenance in specified circumstances; and unsoundness of mind. These examples do not exhaust the kinds of behaviour that may meet section 15(2)(c).[iv]
Section 16(1) begins, “Without prejudice to the generality of section 15(2) of this Act…” Those opening words preserve the wider scope of section 15(2)(c). A petitioner is not restricted to the circumstances listed in section 16(1). As such, it connotes that other conduct may also satisfy the test, depending on the particular marriage and the evidence before the court. This position was recognised by the Supreme Court in Adetule v. Adetule[v] where the Supreme Court treated the circumstances listed in section 16(1) as examples and explained that the conduct must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each marriage, including the incident or incidents complained of.
Domestic Violence and the Waiting Periods
The one-, two- and three-year separation periods often mentioned in discussions about dissolution of marriage relate to particular facts under section 15(2). Paragraph (d) requires desertion for at least one year; paragraph (e) requires the parties to have lived apart for at least two years and the respondent not to object; and paragraph (f) requires at least three years of living apart. A person who relies on one of those facts must establish the required period.
Section 15(2)(c) is a different route. It contains no minimum period of separation. A petitioner who can prove that the respondent’s behaviour makes it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to continue living with them may rely on that fact without first waiting one, two or three years after leaving the matrimonial home. There is an important qualification. Section 30(1) of the Act generally prohibits instituting dissolution proceedings within the first two years after the date of the marriage unless the court grants leave. Section 30(2) removes that restriction only for proceedings based on section 15(2)(a)(refusal to consummate) or (b) (intolerable adultery), section 16(1)(a) (rape, sodomy or bestiality), or cross-proceedings. A petition based on domestic violence as unreasonable behaviour under section 15(2)(c) is not, by itself, among those exceptions. If the marriage is less than two years old, the petitioner must therefore seek leave unless another statutory exception applies. Under section 30(3), leave may be granted only where refusing it would impose exceptional hardship on the applicant or the case involves exceptional depravity by the other spouse. Domestic violence may be relevant to that application, but leave is not automatic.
The length of the separation and the length of the marriage are therefore different questions. Section 15(2)(c) does not require a separation period, while section 30 may still apply if the marriage is less than two years old. A person should not confuse “three years apart” under section 15(2)(f) with a general rule that everyone must wait three years after leaving the matrimonial home before the date of filing.
Other Forms of Conduct That May Satisfy Section 15(2)(c)
Apart from the circumstances expressly identified under section 16(1), courts have recognised other forms of conduct that may satisfy section 15(2)(c).
Damulak v. Damulak
In Damulak v. Damulak[vi], the petitioner relied on several instances of cruelty and ill-treatment by her husband, including repeated physical assaults, verbal abuse and public humiliation. She testified that the repeated assaults had made her feel unsafe. In upholding the dissolution, the Court of Appeal recognised cruelty as conduct that may satisfy section 15(2)(c). The Court also observed that the cumulative effect of acts of ill-treatment, even where individual acts may be minor, may amount to cruelty if their combined effect causes or is likely to cause the suffering spouse to break down under the strain.
Nanna v. Nanna
In Nanna v. Nanna[vii], the husband petitioned for dissolution on the basis that his wife had behaved in a way that he could not reasonably be expected to live with her. The wife filed a cross-petition, alleging that the husband’s misconduct had compelled her to leave the matrimonial home. She testified that he had physically assaulted her, threatened her with violence and eventually forced her out. The Court of Appeal referred to Akinbuwa v. Akinbuwa[viii], observing that a husband beating his wife and causing her injury may amount to cruelty or behaviour the other spouse cannot reasonably be expected to endure. The Court upheld the wife’s cross-petition but dismissed the husband’s petition because he had not sufficiently established his allegations against her.
Gbolade v. Gbolade
The conduct that may fall within section 15(2)(c) is not confined to physical assaults. In Gbolade v. Gbolade[ix], inordinate demands for sexual intercourse were recognised as another form of conduct capable of constituting intolerable behaviour under the provision.
Adaramaja v. Adaramaja
In Adaramaja v. Adaramaja[x], the husband alleged that his wife had subjected him to various acts of cruelty. The conduct included physically preventing him from going on professional tours, tearing his shirt, beating and dragging him in front of other people, and threatening to commit suicide and to kill him. He also testified that the incidents caused him mental distress and worry.
Although the trial court dismissed the petition, the Court of Appeal found that the evidence established a course of wilful, inexcusable and injurious conduct which, taken as a whole, constituted cruelty. The Court allowed the appeal and granted the dissolution, after separately considering the circumstances relevant to the exercise of its discretion.
These decisions illustrate that conduct under section 15(2)(c) is not limited to the circumstances in section 16(1). The court assesses the behaviour in context, including its cumulative effect. Physical violence, emotional abuse, threats, cruelty and other forms of ill-treatment may be relevant, depending on the evidence and circumstances of the marriage. This remedy is available to either spouse.
Adebayo v. Adebayo
A recent decision of the High Court of Lagos State provides a further illustration of section 15(2)(c), and of why a spouse should not assume that the three-year separation period is the only route to dissolution.
In Adebayo v. Adebayo[xi], we represented the petitioner in his application to dissolve the marriage. He relied on incidents of physical assault, threats, verbal abuse and humiliation by the respondent. In his testimony, the petitioner described several assaults, including an incident in which the respondent slapped him, leaving his face bruised. He also described verbal abuse, threats and humiliation which, he said, caused considerable emotional distress and made him feel unsafe in the marriage. The respondent disputed some of the allegations and gave a different account. During cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that she did engage in emotional and physical abuse in the marriage and that the petitioner had said he felt unsafe living with her.
In considering the matter, the High Court addressed the nature and scope of domestic violence and referred to section 18(1)(g) of the Lagos State Protection Against Domestic Violence Law 2007. That provision includes physical, sexual, emotional, verbal, psychological and economic abuse, as well as intimidation, harassment, stalking and other controlling or abusive behaviour that harms or may cause imminent harm to a person’s safety, health or well-being. Section 18(1)(j) further describes emotional, verbal and psychological abuse to include a pattern of degrading or humiliating conduct, repeated insults or threats causing emotional pain, and repeated obsessive possessiveness or jealousy that seriously invades a person’s privacy, liberty, integrity or security.
The Court emphasised the seriousness of domestic violence and its possible consequences, stating: “No one should condone domestic violence in a marriage because same could cause psychological trauma, grievous bodily harm, injury or even death.”
Having considered the evidence, the Court held that the petitioner had established the fact in section 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act and granted a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage.
Why the Adebayo Decision Matters
The petitioner filed his petition immediately after the domestic violence incident that led him to move out of the matrimonial home. His case therefore did not depend on waiting until the parties had lived apart for a year or more. The Court granted a decree nisi on the basis of the behaviour established under section 15(2)(c). The decision illustrates that, where the evidence supports it, a spouse may pursue dissolution on the behaviour fact without first completing the separation periods required by section 15(2)(d), (e), (f), or even (g).
The chronology should not be confused with the separate restriction in section 30. The relevant two-year period under section 30 is measured from the date of the marriage, not from the date the petitioner left the home. Where the marriage is less than two years old, the need for the Court’s leave must be considered, subject to the Act’s exceptions.
Conclusion
Domestic violence is not listed as a standalone ground for dissolving a statutory marriage under the Matrimonial Causes Act. However, abusive conduct may establish the fact in section 15(2)(c): that the respondent has behaved in a way that makes it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to continue living with them. The conduct need not result in repeated convictions before a petitioner can rely on section 15(2)(c). The court must assess the evidence and circumstances of the case. The commonly relied upon three-year separation period of section 15(2)(f) is one route to dissolution but it is not a general waiting period that every spouse must complete before seeking dissolution.
The decision in Adebayo v. Adebayo illustrates that domestic violence may provide a basis for dissolution and that the remedy is available to either spouse. A person experiencing abuse should not assume that the law requires them to wait years after leaving the matrimonial home before seeking relief. The petitioner must still properly plead and prove the relevant facts, and a very recent marriage raises the additional question of leave under section 30.
[i] Matrimonial Causes Act, Cap M7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (MCA).
[ii] Note that the law refers to dissolution and not divorce, however, both have the same meaning.
[iii] Section 69 Interpretation Section of the MCA
[iv] Innocent Okoronye and Charles Okwudiri, Interpretation and Application of Section 15(2)(C) of the Matrimonial Causes Act in Adetule v Adetule: Did the Supreme Court Err? (2023) 3(1) African Journal of Law, Ethics and Education 65.
[v] (2021) LPELR-61667 (SC).
[vi] (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt 874) 151.
[vii] (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt 966) 1.
[viii] (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt 559) 661.
[ix] Suit No WD/37/70 Judgment delivered High Court of Lagos, reported in I. Sagay., Nigeria Family Law Principles Cases, Statute, & commencement, (Malthouse Press Limited Lagos. 1999), 261.
[x] (1962) 1 SCNLR 376.
[xi] Suit No LD/12845HD/2023 (High Court of Lagos State, judgment delivered 29 September 2026).